Response to John Rist’s “Must Morality be Grounded on God?” by Symington, Paul
© Paul Symington, Quaestiones Disputatae,  Vol. 5, No. 1 (Fall 2014)
Response to John Rist’s 
“Must Morality Be Grounded on God?”
Paul Symington
Prof. Rist offers a rich, sophisticated, and persuasive analysis for the view that 
morality must necessarily be grounded in belief  in God, a view with which 
I have much sympathy. Contrary to claims that one can obtain a perfectly 
well-grounded morality without appealing to God by atheist and Christian 
moralists alike, Rist bravely claims not only that morality must be grounded 
in God (ensconced with a non-voluntarist variety), but also that it is best 
grounded specifically in belief  in the Christian God.
 Rist argues that attempts at obtaining grounding for morality inde-
pendently of  God have failed and must fail. Beyond the historical failures 
by moralists such as Kant, Rist argues that any morality that excludes God 
is destined to collapse into an conventionalist or constructivist ethic that by 
definition lacks an external standard; standing without a measure that goes 
beyond that of  man’s mind and interests. Without an external standard for 
morality that transcends humanity, one must exchange the ought of  morality 
with the is of  preference or some actual goal that folks in fact have but need 
not have since there lacks grounding support for it. Certainly Bentham or 
Mill come to mind as holding ethics that lack the kind of  ground that one 
has come to expect in a moral theory, the former indeed even admitting to 
this. But there are conventionalist and constructivist viewpoints (which also 
include Kant upon examination) that although may claim to possess a proper 
grounding nevertheless also lack it. A necessary condition that Rist points 
to for a well-grounded moral system is that one has good reason to believe 
that one ought to do something. On that score, non-theistic moralities hit a 
brick wall: one would be hard pressed to come up with a good reason why 
one ought to do what one prefers, or that which is the greatest good for the 
greatest number, or what is conventional, or to do those actions that have 
been evolutionarily beneficial to us in the past. Each of  these are compatible 
with both a complete lack of  value and with what is merely arbitrary; both 
of  which are antithetical to a thorough-going morality. Beyond this, Rist is 
also wary of  theists who think that one can ground morality independent-
ly of  God by thinking that they can successfully argue for some standards 
of  morality merely consistent with a theistic morality but, for the sake of  
epistemological integrity, disconnect their lines of  argumentation or support 
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from their theistic beliefs. Rist takes note of  an insufficiency in the attempt 
of  grounding morality by way of  claiming that through practical reasoning 
alone one is able to compile a list of  obviously basic goods. Even with this 
approach one must identify God, the object of  religion, as essentially related 
to the basic good of  religion.
 I would, however, like to offer some possible questions or observa-
tions that may make us wonder a little bit that a plausible alternative view-
point on this issue is not possible.
 First, which involves a minor point of  clarity, it is not entirely clear 
whether Rist wants to include with atheists—those that positively exclude 
any theistic foundation for morality and arguably have no ground for mo-
rality—those theists who try to build a case for grounding morality inde-
pendently of  an explicit reference to God. It seems that he wants to include 
both. If  this is so, then it seems relevant to bring in his closing comments in 
which he seems to infer from the fact that one’s philosophical interlocutor 
does not accept a theistic foundation for morality that one ought not to try 
to score moral points without appeal to God. That is, do all arguments that 
do not positively include God as a ground for morality collapse? If  so, this 
appears problematic. Although I think that it is plausible that eventually a 
theistic ethicist will need to appeal to God for a fully robust ethical theory, 
it seems perfectly reasonable given the context and the particular presuppo-
sitions of  some set of  interlocutors that one can make a persuasive ethical 
argument for a particular point of  morality that can be made independently 
of  appeal to God. This point may be irrelevant since Dr. Rist is appealing to 
foundations for morality, but I think that it nevertheless is a fair point to be 
made along the way.
 Second, Rist’s position is a strong one and as a result runs the risk 
of  lapsing into a kind of  triumphalism. A Christian moral triumphalism in 
this context can be identified as a certain cognitive attitude in which Christian 
teaching on morality is thought of  as being complete and independent in the 
sense of  not requiring revision, clarification, integration, or cognitive rela-
tion to so-called naturally rational approaches or experientially related moral 
beliefs. A triumphalistic position on ethics is harmful in the following way: 
it does not emphasize the importance of  integrating the central Christian 
moral principles with naturally recognized good practices and values given 
according to a broad notion of  human experience. To illustrate this, one can 
think of  the teaching of  Christ to turn the other cheek to one’s enemy. How-
ever, it seems that this instruction requires a prior notion of  courage with 
which Christian and non-Christian alike can each identify. Such a recognition 
helps us to integrate this teaching of  Christ most effectively and perfectly 
into our lives. Alternatively, one can conceive of  a misguided application of  
this instruction without courage by using it merely as a justification for mere-
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ly being a coward. So, how does Rist’s position run the danger triumphalism? 
By identifying acts that are not grounded in belief  in God as without moral 
foundation is to simply undermine their ethical status altogether. If  they are 
devoid of  ethical status then it seems to me that a Christian need not have to 
heed them when seeking to follow a particularly Christian moral ethic.
 Finally, Rist seems to assume that a necessary condition for a moral 
belief  being grounded is whether or not one can rationally identify a duty, 
imperative or ought, with respect to a specific action that is performed in 
conformity with that belief. However, it seems possible to me that this is 
not a necessary condition for an action being moral; and so, a fortiori, it need 
not be a condition for an action being morally grounded. That is, one may 
hold that every belief  that one understands that they ought to do is moral 
while also maintaining that not every belief  (or action) that is moral one has 
an obligation to perform. For example, there seems to be occasions when 
we make a moral choice absent of  moral obligation. Such is the case with 
supererogatory or heroic acts of  self-sacrifice. Or, it seems like one has made 
a moral choice when one has chosen a particular career path for the right 
reason, even though they were not morally obliged to do so. Or, if  one is in 
a tight fix where one must choose to do one thing or another each of  which 
are moral, but one cannot do both. Thus, it is not clear to me that when one 
makes some (moral) choice without a moral imperative attached to it that that 
choice must be morally ungrounded. That is, it seems that in some cases in 
which I recognize something as good insofar as I desire it and do the action 
I have done a moral action, even if  one has not done it for the sake it being 
a basic good, etc. One thinks of  someone being inclined to help the prover-
bial old lady cross the street merely because they see it as a good thing to do 
or desire it. So, even if  it is granted that one cannot have moral imperatives 
without God, there still leaves open the possibility that one can make moral 
choices without God.
 However, even if  this scenario is inaccurate and every moral action, 
even so called optional ones, require some grounding in an ought (e.g., I 
ought either to do this or that), is not clear to me that in granting these 
non-imperative oughts one needs always to appeal to God in order to gain 
knowledge of  it as an ought or as rational. That is, it seems reasonable, for 
example, to say that one wants to be happy, one cannot not desire their own 
happiness, so in order to be happy one ought to act in certain ways so as to 
uniformly achieve this fixed goal. Another possibility: one can say that one 
has a basic or fundamental rational intuition into basic goods and this intu-
ition occurs independently of  belief  in God. Rist seems to imply that this 
leaves one open to not being able to argue against those who would try to 
bury this intuition or distort it. But, this argument is problematic: it is like 
saying that one cannot believe in the principle of  non-contradiction unless 
29paul SyMinGton
it can be grounded in something else. Why not simply say that one has had 
a rational intuition into something as a basic good and so is justified on that 
basis, not unlike saying that one is justified in the principle of  non-contradic-
tion in the same way?
 One may be able to look for an alternative source for moral ground-
ing. Perhaps a choice has moral grounding when it is enacted with a combi-
nation of  a natural inclination (which provides motivation) and some recog-
nition that it is ordered in some way to contributing to their happiness. I want 
to be happy, and I cannot act otherwise with respect to this, and so I ought 
to do this in order to be happy. Of  course at this point, one need not wonder 
where one is going with this: to a eudaimonistic ethics. Such an ethic has hap-
piness or one’s perfection as the ultimate end that motivates one to action, 
is obtained in conformity with a rational process of  choice, and allows for 
actions to be optional and moral; that there are a range of  goods (either truly 
or according to an appearance) that one ought to obtain in a rational way so 
as to obtain genuine or true goods (determined, perhaps, as being mutually 
consistent and obtainable or intuited as ordered to a basic good). In addition, 
a Christian will hold that one’s inclination or will is not satisfied by created 
goods and so the object of  God is left as an open question, without being 
required to be positively appealed to in order to ground all obtainable goods.
 Yet, Rist aptly supports his claim that Christianity most effectively 
serves as the ground for morality by pointing to the fact that God relates 
to us personally. This recognition is a game changer for the proclivity in eu-
daimonistic ethics to be merely about obtaining those goods that are primarily 
good for oneself; a view that has earned for it the charge of  “egoism.” How-
ever, Rist makes us see that in Christianity a kind of  reversal occurs: one sees 
that any goodness or perfection in oneself  is merely a pale reflection of  the 
perfection that is personally grounded in God; I must become less so that 
He may become more. In this way, a Christian ethic becomes fundamentally 
re-oriented and grounded in communion, humility, and grace.
 All in all, I congratulate Prof. Rist on an excellent paper and I thank 
him for his contribution to our progress in thinking about this fundamental 
issue.
—Franciscan University of Steubenville
